Third and finally, while many accounts of both Council and comitology decision-making emphasize the prospect of deliberative decision-making in technical areas such as the approval of individual GM varieties following technical risk assessments, we find little evidence of meaningful deliberation in either comitology committees or in the Council, reflecting the intense politicization of the issue in the national politics of the EU's member states. More precisely, we argue that the record of legislative and, in particular, executive decision-making in the Council is one of bitter disputes, bargaining from fixed positions, formal voting, and ultimate deadlock in decision after decision. This finding, we argue, should not come as a surprise to sophisticated theorists of deliberation who have always conceded that successful deliberation should take place only under certain scope conditions. Indeed, we argue, deliberation is something of a hothouse flower, which has not found a receptive home in the politically charged area of GMO regulation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in five parts. First, we examine the theoretical literature on deliberation in international politics, noting the nature of deliberation and 'arguing' in relation to other theoretical approaches, the scope conditions for successful deliberation posited by theorists, and the empirical debates about deliberation in EU politics. Second, we introduce the issue of genetic modification in the EU and recount briefly the adoption of the first EU Directives on the subject. During this first period, we argue, the GM issue had not yet become politicized, and Council bargaining consisted largely of asserting member-state prerogatives vis-à-vis the supranational Commission. Third, we examine the politicization of the issue after the mid-1990s, and the subsequent difficulties of implementation, as controversy led to deadlock and ultimately to a de-facto moratorium. In the fourth section, we summarize the Council's bargaining over the strengthening of the EU's increasingly complex legislative framework, while the fifth section chronicles the continuing bitter divisions in the Council, even after the completion of the legal framework (in 2003) , the resumption of approvals (in 2004) , and the WTO decision in the GMO case (in 2006) . Evidence of deliberation in these settings, we contend, is hard to find. The conclusion summarizes our findings, with an emphasis on the impact of politicization and uncertainty on deliberation, and the distinctive patterns of Council decision-making across its legislative and executive functions.
I. Deliberation and Arguing in International and EU Politics
Over the past decade, a growing number of scholars have identified the Council of Ministers, as well as its Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and working groups, as a potential site of 'deliberative supranationalism,' an efficient and normatively desirable system in which national government officials meet and deliberate in search of the best solution to common policy problems (Joerges 2001) . This emphasis on deliberation -reiterated in an exploding body of literature -derives largely from the work of Jürgen Habermas, whose theory of communicative action has been adapted to the study of international relations and to the study of EU governance. 2 Under this Habermasian conception, actors are able to agree on a common policy because they are willing to yield to the force of the better argument and find reasoned consensus on basic validity claims and their implications.
The starting point for such deliberative approaches is the claim, made most clearly by Thomas Risse in the field of international politics, that there is not one but three 'logics of social action,' namely (1) the logic of consequentiality (or utility maximization) emphasized by rationalchoice theorists, (2) the logic of appropriateness (or norm-guided behavior) associated with sociological institutionalist and constructivist theory, and (3) a logic of arguing (or deliberation) derived largely from Habermas' theory of communicative action. The first of these approaches, the 'logic of consequentiality,' derives from the expected-utility assumptions of most rational-choice theories, namely that actors (be they individuals, firms, or states) possess specific preferences over states of the world, and act systematically to maximize their respective utility under physical and social constraints.
These core assumptions of rational-choice, and the theories on which they are based, have recently been challenged by the growing number of constructivist and sociological institutionalist theorists in international law and international relations. For constructivists, institutions are understood broadly to include not only formal rules but also informal norms, and these rules and norms are expected to constitute actors, i.e. to shape their identities and their preferences. Actor preferences are not exogenously given and fixed, as in rationalist models, but endogenous to institutions, and individuals' identities shaped and re-shaped by their social environment (Risse 2004) .
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, many constructivist and sociological institutionalist scholars embraced March and Olsen's (1989: 160-62 ) conception of a logic of appropriateness guiding human action. According to March and Olsen, institutions do not simply provide a set of strategic constraints within which actors seek to maximize their individual utility. Rather, institutional rules, routines and roles are internalized and followed 'even when it is not obviously in the narrow self-interest of the person responsible to do so ' (March and Olsen 1989: 22) . Faced with a given choice or social situation, March and Olsen argue, actors do not necessarily calculate the expected utility of alternative courses of action given their specific preferences and choose the optimal one, but rather seek to undertake the action most appropriate to their social role and the nature of the situation. This conception of social action has proven influential in constructivist international relations theory as well as normative legal theory, in which international institutions are posited to 'teach' norms to states and their representatives, who behave 'appropriately' given their socially learned rules and roles. 3 Drawing on Habermas' theory of communicative action, however, Risse argues for a third logic of social behavior, which he calls the 'logic of arguing,' derived largely from Habermas's theory of communicative action and emphasizing the interrelated concepts of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion (Risse 2000: 1-2) . In Habermasian communicative action, or what Risse calls the logic of arguing, political actors do not simply bargain based on fixed preferences and relative power; they may also 'argue,' questioning their own beliefs and preferences, and being open to persuasion and the power of the better argument:
Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumentative rationality also implies that the participants in a discourse are open to being persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and hierarchy recede into the background. Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain one's fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus. Actors' interests, preferences and perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges. Where argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their interests and preferences, but to challenge and justify the validity claims inherent in them -and they are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument (Risse 2000: 7) .
At the extreme, Risse argues, we can distinguish two distinct types of social interaction: bargaining, in which actors with fixed preferences negotiate and exchange threats and promises in an effort to maximize their respective preferences, and arguing, in which open-minded participants seek to discover the truth, and indeed their own preferences, through a collective process of deliberation, argumentation, and persuasion.
Habermas and his followers in the study of international relations concede that genuine communicative action, or argumentative rationality, is likely under a fairly restrictive set of three preconditions, which include:
(1) The existence of a 'common lifeworld' among the participants; (2) 'Uncertainty of interests and/or a lack of knowledge about the situation' among the actors, which both encourages the search for truth and makes actors uncertain about the distributive implications (i.e., winners and losers) of any agreement; and (3) 'International institutions based on nonhierarchical relations enabling dense interactions in informal, network-like settings' (Risse 2000: 19-20) .
Increasingly, analysts of deliberative decision-making attempt to articulate and operationalize clear scope conditions for deliberation, and most of these analysts include these three conditions of a common lifeworld, complexity and uncertainty, and ongoing discussions in an informal institutional setting. 4 By contrast, we find some disagreement in the literature about the significance of other factors, including openness, transparency, and politicization: While some scholars argue that it is the public nature of deliberative democracy that requires actors to limit their appeals to naked selfinterest 5 , other scholars posit that individual participants are more likely to leave aside preconceptions and fixed interests, and join in the collective search for truth, in closed, in camera settings where compromise will not be second-guessed by governmental leaders or public opinion 'back home.' 6 Empirical studies of deliberation face significant methodological hurdles in distinguishing between arguing and bargaining, or between genuine communicative action and 'cheap talk.' 7 Despite these obstacles, the promise of deliberation has received extraordinary attention within the study of the European Union, whose dense institutional environment and networked forms of governance are seen as a particularly promising place to look for evidence of international deliberation. In addition to the Council of Ministers, EU scholars have identified the promise of deliberation in three EU-related forums: comitology committees 8 , the Constitutional Convention of 2003-2004 9 , and the 'new governance' mechanisms of the Open Method of Coordination. 10 These studies, moreover, have grown in methodological as well as theoretical sophistication over time, with scholars like undertaking close ethnographic observation of negotiations and extensive structured interviews to get at the character of individual speech acts, change or continuity in individual preferences, and the conditions most conducive to successful deliberation. 11
Against this background, it is not surprising that both scholars and practitioners began, from the late 1990s onwards, to hold out the promise of international deliberation on agricultural biotechnology, both within EU institutions and in other international fora such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, insofar as the scientific and technical questions raised by GMOs might encourage a collective search for truth and for the best policy. 12 And indeed, some scholars have advocated ambitious proposals to establish a global 'epistemic community of knowledgeable state and non-state actors representing a wide range of affected interests, common perspectives and bargaining positions' which could 'develop convergent policies and expectations,' and which ultimately could lead to a stronger 'transnational legal regime' with 'more complete and precise rules' that would be 'more likely to promote state compliance' (Murphy 2001: 339) .
It is the central claim of this paper, however, that the issue of agricultural biotechnology turned out to be far less conducive to deliberation than would be predicted by some deliberative theorists, not only in traditional international regimes (the subject of our larger book) but also within EU institutions themselves. Deliberation within such bodies, we find, has fallen victim to the widespread politicization of the GM issue, such that there has been severe tension between the mass politics of GM issues, often characterized by a 'logic of polarization and escalation' (Seifert 2006) , and deliberation within the comitology and Council processes. Member-state officials in such committees have faced intense public pressures and extraordinary public scrutiny, which have combined to create a climate inhospitable to compromise or to careful deliberation within the Council or comitology committees. Our point is not to argue that EU policy is dysfunctional or irrational -although many critics have argued precisely that -but simply that both legislative and regulatory decisions on GMOs have been taken in a politicized environment in which bargaining from fixed positions and formal voting have been common, and deliberation and consensus virtually absent.
Empirically, our focus here is on the long-term development of EU regulation of GM foods and crops, and so we do not undertake the close textual analysis of individual arguments and speech acts in individual decisions that scholars like Checkel, Lewis and Niemann have undertaken in their studies of Council decision-making. Instead, we rely on broader, publicly available sources and indicators of arguing and bargaining behavior, supplemented by interviews with EU and member state officials. Following both the literature on deliberation and the canonical Council literature, we expect that deliberative member governments would -at a minimum -strive for consensus, offer reasoned explanations for their positions, and avoid pressing for a vote in the Council. In the following analysis of Council and committee negotiations over the EU's regulatory framework as well as the approval of individual GMOs, however, we find a strikingly different pattern -one in which EU governments rarely reach consensus, regularly press for a vote even when hopelessly deadlocked, and offer no or only perfunctory arguments for their national positions.
II. The Beginnings of EU Biotechnology Policy: Protecting the Council's Institutional Interests
The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community made no explicit mention of an EU policy for biotechnology, which remained primarily a national responsibility within each of the Community's member states. Nevertheless, the EU has developed a de facto policy on biotechnology over the past four decades, as the EU's policies on agriculture and the establishment of an internal market for biotech products have 'spilled over' into the regulation of the content and labeling of European food products. 13 While EU decision-making became gradually more centralized over time, such that key decisions are taken by EU political bodies such as the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament, these bodies work in an uneasy relationship with competent authorities in the member states, thereby requiring member state cooperation for effective implementation of EU policy.
We start our story in the late 1980s when the Commission put forward a proposal for a 'deliberate release' Directive to regulate the planting and marketing of GM varieties. Noting the extraordinary diversity of existing national regulations across the various member states, ranging from a ban on deliberate releases in Denmark and Germany to an absence of any regulation in other member states, the Commission proposed an EU regulatory scheme that would provide for case-bycase assessment and authorization of the release of all GM varieties into the environment. More specifically, the Commission's proposal would require any individual wishing to release GMOs into the environment (e.g. for farming or marketing) to notify and provide a detailed risk assessment to the competent regulatory authority of the EU member state in which the release was proposed. That member state would then be charged with evaluating the application in line with the provisions of the directive. If the member state rejected the proposal, the procedure would end, but if the member state accepted the proposal, the dossier would then be forwarded to the Commission and to the other member governments, which would have a limited period to object to the authorization. If no objections were put forward, the product would be authorized for release and/or placement on the market throughout the EU. By contrast, if one or more member governments or the Commission objected, the Commission would then undertake its own assessment and formulate a decision to approve or deny the application. The Commission's draft decision would be circulated to an advisory committee of member-state representatives, of whose opinion the Commission would have to take 'utmost account'; the final decision, however, would remain with the Commission. In a final acknowledgement of member-state prerogatives, however, the Commission proposed a 'safeguard procedure' whereby a member state could, if it had evidence of a serious risk to people or the environment from a previously approved GMO, 'provisionally restrict or prohibit the use or sale of that product on its territory.' Once again, however, the member state in question would have to inform the Commission of its actions and give reasons for its decision, and the Commission would retain the power to approve or reject the measures in question (Commission 1988) .
The European Parliament -which has emerged as a consistent champion of strict regulation of biotechnology over the past two decades -criticized the Commission proposal as being too lax on a number of points, and proposed a number of amendments that would have substantially tightened regulatory restrictions on the approval of GMOs.
The Council of Ministers, operating as the Environmental Council, 14 followed the broad lines of the original Commission proposal, rejecting the Parliament's most far-reaching amendments. The Council did, however, protect its own prerogatives vis-à-vis the Commission, by modifying the procedure whereby the Commission could issue approvals for new GM varieties: Whereas the original text provided for the Commission decision to be subject only to an advisory committee of member-state representatives, the final text featured a more constraining 'regulatory committee,' which could approve a draft Commission decision by a qualified majority vote. If the regulatory committee did not approve the decision, however, it was to be sent to the Council of Ministers, which could approve the Commission decision by qualified majority or reject it by a unanimous vote. If the Council failed to act within three months, the directive provided that 'the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission' (Article 21). Finally -and significantly, in light of later developments -the Council retained a slightly modified version of the Commission's safeguard 14 It has become commonplace to speculate that the EU's strict rules on GMOs, and the Council's unwillingness to approve new varieties by a qualified majority, can be attributed at least in part to the leading role of environment ministers rather than, say, ministers for trade or for the internal market. We are agnostic on this point, however, noting below that ministers in any Council configuration would be under intense pressure from national capitals and would likely have little room for independent decision-making.
clause, whereby a member state could, on the basis of new evidence about risks to human health or the environment, 'provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that product on its territory' (Article 16). The member state in question would be required to inform the Commission, which would approve or reject the measures in cooperation with the regulatory committee mentioned above.
The result in 1990 was Directive 90/220 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, which governed for over a decade the approval, planting, and marketing of GM foods and crops within the European Union. 15 Overall, during this early period, negotiations between the Commission, Council and EP about the basic regulatory structure attracted little public attention -largely because no GM food or crop had yet been proposed, approved, or marketed in Europe -and the negotiations both within the Council and between the Council and other bodies were largely concerned with the respective roles and prerogatives of the member governments and the Commission in the EU's decentralized regulatory system. This pattern, however, was about to change.
III. Implementing EU Policies: Not Deliberation, but Politicization, Deadlock, and Moratorium
The politics of GMO regulation in the European Union changed over the course of the mid1990s, as GM foods moved from the laboratory to the marketplace and as the Union experienced a series of food-safety scandals, most notably the BSE scandal that struck in 1996. In March of that year, the British government of Prime Minister John Major revealed a possible connection between Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease, a fatal disease for humans, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a disease spread among cattle through their consumption of contaminated feed, popularly known as 'mad cow disease.' Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the BSE scandal raised the question of risk regulation 'to the level of high politics, and indeed of constitutional significance' (Chalmers 2003: 534-538) , generating extraordinary public awareness of food safety issues and widespread public distrust of regulators and scientific assessments.
It was in this socio-political context that genetically modified crops were first commercially introduced in the United States and Europe. In April 1996, within a month of the ban on British beef, the Commission approved the sale of a genetically modified soy product over the objections of some member states. In November 1996, the GM soy was imported from the United States to the EU, spurring widespread protest by Greenpeace and other groups. Public distrust of US intentions was magnified further when, the following month, the United States and Canada lodged complaints before the World Trade Organization challenging the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef.
The close succession of these events illustrates how the popular understanding of GM products in Europe became associated with consumer anxieties related to food safety crises, distrust of regulators and scientific assessments, disquiet over corporate control of agricultural production, ethical unease over genetic modification techniques, environmental concerns, and anger over the use by the United States of international trade rules to attempt to force 'unnatural' foods on Europeans.
A widespread cross-sectoral movement organized to oppose GMOs in Europe, bringing together environmentalists, consumers, and small farmers (Ansell, Maxwell and Sicurelli 2006) , raising the political profile of GM policy across the EU in a common manner, although having different characteristics in discrete national arenas (Seifert 2006) . In the midst of the fray, the Commission approved in January 1997 the sale of another GM food crop (a Bt corn variety owned by Novartis) over the objection or abstention of all but one of the fifteen member governments. The Commission was able to do so because of the approval procedure set forth in Directive 90/220. Under the Directive, a member state (in this case France) could approve a GM variety and forward its decision to the Commission and the other member states so that the variety could be marketed throughout the EU. Since some member states objected to this approval, the Commission reviewed the dossier, which it did favorably. The Commission then submitted a draft authorization to the regulatory committee consisting of a representative from each member state. Eight member state representatives on the committee abstained or voted against the approval, so that the Commission forwarded its proposal to the Council (operating as the Environment Council). However, the Council could only amend the Commission's proposal by a unanimous vote, and France announced that it supported the Commission's authorization (Bradley 1998: 212) . As a result, even though fourteen member states either opposed or abstained from supporting the Commission at this point, the approval went forward. Soon even France opposed commercialization of this GM variety, following shifts in French domestic politics. 16 The member states did not simply accept the Commission's decision as the final say. They actively undermined its implementation, invoking the safeguard clause of Directive 90/220 and calling for a moratorium on approvals, including solely for consumption as food or animal feed, regardless of scientific studies of the characteristics of a specific variety. Austria was the first to act under the safeguard clause, promptly prohibiting the cultivation and marketing of the GM maize variety on February 14, 1997. Luxembourg followed suit on March 17. Over time, more member states deployed safeguard bans, undermining the central purpose of Directive 90/220 to create a single market for GM crops under a harmonized regulatory system. By January 2004, nine memberstate safeguards, applied by Austria, France, Greece, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, were in effect for various GM varieties (Commission 2004a).
In response to the popular backlash against GMOs successfully stirred by non-governmental groups and captured in national media, a group of member states (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) pronounced in June 1999 the need to impose a moratorium on all approvals of GM products, pending the adoption of a new and stricter regulatory system. In an annex to the press release of the Environment Council meeting in Luxembourg on June 24/25 1999, the Danish, French, Greek, Italian and Luxembourg delegations declared:
The Governments of the following Member States, in exercising the powers vested in them regarding the growing and placing on the market of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), [...] point to the importance of the Commission submitting without delay full draft rules ensuring labeling and traceability of GMOs and GMOderived products and state that, pending the adoption of such rules, in accordance with preventive and precautionary principles, they will take steps to have any new authorizations for growing and placing on the market suspended (Council of the European Union 1999).
The following year, in December 2000, the Council adopted a resolution on the 'precautionary principle,' maintaining that risk assessment may not always be possible on account of insufficient data, and that risk management decisions should consider not only scientific data but also the 'public acceptability' of the proposed products (Council of the European Union 2000). For the next six years, armed with a doctrinal justification for precaution and a substantial minority within the Council, this group of member governments would block the authorization of any new GM variety in the Council. In short, there would be no new approvals regardless of scientific evaluations of any specific variety, whatever its use.
IV. Reforming the Legislative Framework
By the late 1990s, the EU's regulatory system -strict in terms of law and paralyzed in practice by a moratorium within the Council -came under significant external pressure, both because the EU's trading partners, led by the United States, began to press the EU to accept its growing number of GM foods and crops, and because EU standards were, at least in theory, subject to the discipline of WTO law under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. This threat of a WTO legal action put the Commission in even more of a defensive mode. Caught between a growing number member state governments intent on ever-stricter regulations and US challenges to the moratorium, the Commission pursued a dual-track strategy, proposing a series of new EU regulations to satisfy member-state demands while calling repeatedly for a resumption of GM approvals by the EU.
Toward this end, in January 2000 the Commission issued a White Paper on Food Safety in which it proposed that the EU overhaul its food safety system and establish a new European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), to assist with risk regulation. The White Paper set forth the EU's general approach to risk regulation in the food sector, dividing 'risk assessment' from 'risk management.' Specialized scientific committees within the new food authority would conduct scientific risk assessments of new GM varieties. Risk management, by contrast, would remain under the control of the EU's political bodies (Commission 2006a) .
Over the next several years, the Commission put forward proposals for a series of new Directives and Regulations that would supplement and eventually replace Directive 90/220. These new rules would establish stricter criteria for the deliberate release and marketing of GM foods and crops, extend the coverage of EU regulation to animal feed as well as food for human consumption, establish a labeling and traceability system for GM foods and crops, and set up thresholds for the 'adventitious presence' of GMOs in conventional foods. In each case, the European Parliament, which enjoyed the power of co-decision for the proposed legislation, pressed for the establishment of ever-stricter standards. Within the Council, EU member states were mixed in their views, with some appearing to do whatever possible to ensure that no GM crops would be grown in their territories (such as Austria and Luxembourg), and others being torn between the demands of GM opponents and those of the biotech sector (such as Germany and the United Kingdom).
The first piece of amending legislation, Directive 2001/18, was finally adopted in March 2001 by co-decision between the Council and the European Parliament. 17 Once more, the need to assuage those member states that desired stringent regulation of GMOs had led to a ratcheting up of EU regulatory requirements for GMOs so as to facilitate the free circulation of agricultural and food products in a single EU market (Young 2003) . More specifically, under the directive's environmental release requirements, member state and applicant obligations had been enhanced to include a more extensive environmental risk assessment, further information concerning the conditions of the release, and monitoring and remedial plans.
Although touted by the EP's rapporteur David Bowe as 'the toughest laws on GMOs in the whole world,' 18 Regulation 1829/2003 created a more centralized authorization procedure to regulate the placing of GM food and feed on the EU market. The member state authority that receives an application file now immediately must provide the file to the European Food Safety Authority, which conducts a scientific risk assessment for submission to the Commission, the member states, the applicant and the general public. The Commission is then to issue a draft decision, which may vary from EFSA's opinion. The Commission's draft decision is again provided to the regulatory committee consisting of member state representatives. However, now the member states can overturn a Commission decision by a qualified majority vote, as opposed to a unanimous one under the earlier Directive. In addition to this revised approval process, the new Regulation retains the earlier Directive's provisions for unilateral member-state safeguard bans: the Commission had initially proposed eliminating these provisions, but the Parliament and Council succeeded in including this clause, once again reaching consensus to defend member-state prerogatives vis-à-vis the Commission.
V. The End of the Moratorium -but not of Controversy
With the 'completion' of the EU's legislative framework for agricultural biotechnology, the Commission at long last sought to enforce existing legislation, resume approvals of new GM varieties after the six-year moratorium, and bring an end to the national bans on varieties that had been accepted by the EFSA as safe. Yet despite Commission efforts, the pattern of formal voting and deadlock within both the regulatory committee and the full Council has continued, reflecting ongoing politicization. The 'completion' of the EU's regulatory structure, whatever its other merits, has not changed the contentious nature of Council bargaining in this issue-area.
In the middle of the WTO legal case brought by the US, the Commission resumed approvals of new GM varieties in May 2004 after a six-year lapse. By that time, the Commission had received twenty-two notifications for approvals of genetically modified varieties -eleven involving import processing only, and eleven for cultivation, none of which had been submitted for approval by the member states (Commission 2004a). In November 2003, the Commission proposed to approve the importation of a variety of GM maize (Bt-11 sweet corn), for which EFSA had delivered a favorable opinion. It was the first time that the Commission had initiated a GM approval since 1998. The regulatory committee, however, again refused to approve the Commission's proposal so that the matter was referred to the Council, which was given until the end of April to act. 20 On 26 April 2004, a divided Agriculture Council failed to reach agreement on the Commission's proposal. 21 In the absence of a decision by the Council, the Commission was free to adopt the proposal -the first new approval of a GM variety in nearly six years.
Subsequent approval procedures showed repeated deadlock, resulting in Commission approvals without a qualified majority of member states in support or in opposition. One month following the approval of the Bt-11 sweet corn, a similar pattern emerged when the Environment Council of a newly enlarged EU met to consider the Commission's recommendation to approve another Monsanto variety, the NK603 genetically modified corn. The Council was again divided, with nine member states (including four of the new members) reportedly voting against, nine in favor, and seven abstaining (Spiteri 2004) Far from typical of comitology committees, this series of deadlocks, and the resulting submissions to the Council, is highly unusual. In its report on the workings of comitology committees for 2005, for example, the Commission noted that, out of 2,637 draft decisions submitted to committees that year, only 11 of those decisions (less than .5%) were referred to the Council for a decision -and six of these eleven were draft decisions authorizing the placing on the market of GM foods and crops. 22 The pattern of deadlock, moreover, persisted in the Council of Ministers (meeting variously in its Environmental and Agriculture formations), which failed repeatedly to reach qualified majorities for or against the approval of one new GM variety after another, leaving the Commission in each case to authorize the new variety unilaterally, to choruses of condemnation from member governments, members of the European Parliament, and environmental and consumer groups. 23 In May 2005, the new Barroso Commission held an 'orientation debate' on GMOs, examining past Commission policy and laying down guidelines for future Commission action to implement the EU's legal framework for GM foods and crops. In preparation for this meeting, an interservice group of Commissioners prepared an internal communication to the College of Commissioners, which is remarkable for the candor with which it describes the state of affairs, and is worth citing at length. The Communication (Commission 2005a) begins by noting that the completion of the EU's strict regulatory framework had not succeeded in overcoming resistance to GMOs among the public or among the representatives of the member states. With regard to the latter, the Commissioners noted the difficulty of resuming approvals and of overturning the memberstate bans in the face of member-state opposition:
At the current time, only a few Member States tend to vote consistently in favour while several Member States tend to vote consistently against and many abstain. Other Member States' position varies; some of them consistently follow the advice of their own scientific bodies which sometimes diverge from the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assessments.
Against this background, it will be difficult if not impossible to obtain a qualified majority either in favour or against the approval of the pending decisions in either the Regulatory Committee or the Council. (Commission 2005a: 3, bold in original) .
In light of this situation, the Communication laid out a plan of specific actions, including the final approval two pending GM varieties of canola and corn, and the continued submission to the Regulatory Committee and the Council of draft approvals for all new GM varieties 'if there are no risks to human health and to the environment based on scientific information' (Commission 2005a: 7).
Perhaps most strikingly, the Commission commented on the role of the member governments in the Regulatory Committee and the Council and their failure to provide clear rationales for their positions. It set down an explicit challenge to the member governments: In the current legal context, when submitting proposals following an inconclusive opinion of the Regulatory Committee, the concerned Councils should be requested to hold a thorough debate in order to avoid adoption by abstention and to openly discuss the reasons for their reluctance to support the authorization of specific products which the Commission considers to be in compliance with the EU regulatory framework (Commission 2005a: 7, bold in original, italics added for emphasis).
In this remarkable passage, the Commissioners, in effect, call upon the Council to engage in the type of deliberation that had been called for by scholars such as Habermas and Joerges, but had been strikingly absent within the Council or its committees in this issue-area. The Commission meeting itself revealed some differences among the various Commissioners in their attitudes toward GM foods and crops, and the full Commission reportedly decided to delete in full the previously cited paragraph calling on the Council to have a thorough debate (European Report 2005b) . This action itself suggests a lack of faith in such a deliberative process in the politically polarized EU and international context.
Interviewees confirm the Commission's frustration with the lack of reasoned deliberation in the regulatory committee and Council over GMO approvals. As one member state representative describes the comitology process for GMO approvals:
The Commission presents a text for a variety's approval and sends it to the member states within the time limit provided for the Regulation (generally from 15-30 days in advance).
The member state representatives come to the meeting and there is a first tour de table in which remarks are usually very general because if you clearly say you are for or against authorization, then the Commission won't listen to your proposals for changes in the text, such as the addition of further conditions for an approved variety. Then a representative will push further and countries start declaring their positions. The coffee break becomes an important time when countries discuss their positions, including regarding textual revisions. Generally some countries have engaged positions. Other countries are less clear. Those countries that are less clear can have an advantage because the Commission is more likely to take account of their textual amendments in order to obtain their vote. Germany is an example of a country that is excellent in creating suspense. For Austria, however, the Commission knows it will always vote no so the Commission has no reason to accept Austria's amendments to its draft decision. Having a clear position weakens your position vis-à-vis the Commission. 24
Once again, we see very little evidence here, or in other sources, of deliberative decision-making when it comes to approval of new GM varieties. While some member-state votes have varied by the GM variety under consideration (so that, for example, a country may vote yes to approve the sale of a GM cut flower but no for the approval of a corn variety), most member governments appear to vote consistently for or against approval of any GMOs (or in some cases, consistently abstain), and national representatives appear to have little flexibility to change their national position on the basis of information presented in comitology meetings or in the Council.
The only issue over which member states continue to reach consensus in this area is to protect member state sovereignty. In its 2005 release, the Commission indicated that it would pursue a legal challenge to the eight national bans that had persisted under the safeguard clause. The European Food Safety Authority had concluded that none of these bans was justified in scientific terms, and in November 2004 the Commission proposed to the Regulatory Committee that these bans be overturned. The committee again deadlocked in March 2005, returning the question to the Commission. The Commission resolved to forward the eight draft decisions to the Council of Ministers, but suffered a major setback at the Environment Council of 22 June 2005. On this issue, the Council was able to summon lopsided majorities of 22 member states voting to reject the Commission proposals -the first qualified majority that the Council had summoned for or against any Commission proposal on GMOs -and thus uphold the continuation of the member-state bans. 25 Luxembourg Environment Minister Lucien Lux, who chaired the meeting during the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council, expressed his 'great satisfaction' at the outcome, noting pointedly that, 'We were able to give a clear message to the European Commission.' 26 In sum, member states agreed to protect their unilateral powers so that they would not be pressed to give reasons for the safeguards in a legal proceeding before the European Court of Justice, as provided for in the Regulation.
In November 2006, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted the panel ruling in the case brought against the EU by the US, Canada and Argentina. The panel found in favor of the complainants, holding that the EU engaged in 'undue delay' in its approval process on account of the de facto moratorium. Moreover, the panel found that all nine of the member state safeguard bans violated the EU's substantive obligations under the SPS Agreement because they were 'not based on a risk assessment.' 27 The WTO panel, in focusing on the EU's delay in applying its procedures, implicitly criticized the Council for failing to deliberate and take a reasoned decision on a case-bycase basis. It can also be viewed as implicitly criticizing the Commission for failing to challenge the member state safeguards before the Court of Justice under EU law, as it referred repeatedly to EFSA's opinions that the safeguards were not scientifically justified.
The impact of the WTO panel decision on the comitology committees and the Council so far appears limited. Throughout 2006, and into 2007, the Commission continued to put forward draft decisions approving new GM varieties, including three GM canola varieties, a carnation featuring genetically enhanced colors and a potato modified to produce a high starch content for use in paper. In each case, the relevant comitology committees deadlocked, unable to reach qualified majorities for or against the proposal, and Commission brought yet another challenge, this time to Hungary's ban on a genetically modified corn which EFSA once again ruled to be as safe as conventional maize. The Hungarian government, for its part, actively lobbied its fellow governments, including the more GM-friendly new members Bulgaria and Romania, for support in retaining the ban. 28 Here again, a large majority rallied around the right of member governments to retain national bans on specific GM varieties and not be challenged before the Court of Justice, with only Finland, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden supporting the Commission's proposal and Romania abstaining (Council of the European Union 2007: 23-26). Here again, however, we see no evidence of consensual decision-making other than a log-rolling defense of national sovereignty vis-à-vis the Commission.
Conclusions
In some respects, the story of EU agricultural biotechnology law and politics presented in this chapter corresponds to standard accounts of Council decision-making, including the impossibility of isolating intra-Council bargaining from inter-institutional bargaining with the Commission and the Parliament, as well as the tendency of the Council to protect its own (and the member states' individual) prerogatives in such inter-institutional bargains. Despite these similarities, we highlight three striking features of the agricultural biotechnology case as it relates to Council decision-making and to the role of the Council in the EU's institutional balance.
First, as we have seen, the issue of agricultural biotechnology has not been conducive to the sort of deliberative decision-making in the comitology process predicted and advocated by Joerges and others. Both in regulatory committees, and in the Council itself, we find neither the deliberative search for better policy emphasized by deliberative theorists, nor even the consensual culture of compromise described in the canonical Council literature (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2005). Instead, across both comitology committees and the Council, we find a record of persistent conflict, bargaining from fixed positions, formal votes on nearly every proposed decision, substantial numbers of abstentions (representing a refusal to take a position) and ultimate deadlock. We have suggested in this paper that these features are largely a result of the intense politicization of the GM issue in public opinion, which has severely limited the ability of member-state representatives to engage in the sort of deliberative search for better policy depicted in the Habermasian literature. In this sense, our analysis lends further support to the view that transparency and politicization decrease the prospect for deliberation in transnational bodies, which appears to function most effectively in closed, in-camera settings. If confirmed by other studies, this finding suggests a stark normative trade-off between transparency and openness, on the one hand, and deliberative decisionmaking on the other.
A second, related, point concerns the causal role of complexity and uncertainty in fostering deliberative decision-making. Habermasian theorists of deliberation, we have seen, often posit complexity and uncertainty as providing favorable conditions for deliberation, on the plausible reasoning that uncertainty places a premium on truth-seeking while obscuring distributional conflicts associated with hardball bargaining. Our findings, however, suggest that the positive role of uncertainty can be limited, and may in some instances cut against deliberation. Uncertainty's role can be limited, we argue, because despite the scientific complexity of agricultural biotechnology as an issue, the various actors in the debate -including biotech companies, farmers, and the member governments that represent them -appear quite able to articulate their own interests vis-à-vis GM foods and crops, and fight for their preferred positions in distributive bargaining. Just as importantly, we find that uncertainty can cut both ways in areas of risk regulation such as agricultural biotechnology. Faced with environmental and food-safety risks that cannot be measured with absolute certainty, many European consumers, member governments, and EU institutions themselves have opted in favor a rather extreme interpretation of the precautionary principle, in which uncertainty yields, not a collective search for truth, but a rigid and uncompromising rejection of GMOs, with little or no regard for the causal arguments (e.g. scientific risk assessments) in their favor.
Third and finally, the issue-area of agricultural biotechnology appears to blur the lines between the Council and comitology committees, and between legislation and implementation. In the textbook account, the Council acts first and foremost as a legislator, with much of the decisionmaking taking place in Coreper and (to a lesser extent) in the Council; secondarily, the Council also plays an executive role, but in most instances this role is delegated in practice to comitology committees, which supervise the Commission in the implementation of legislation and play a primarily technocratic role, with voting a rarity. In the area of agricultural biotechnology, by contrast, comitology committees have engaged in frequent voting, and just as importantly have repeatedly implicated the Council by failing to muster a qualified majority either for or against the Commission's proposed decisions. Within the Council, moreover, the EU's framework GMO regulation requires that any Council vote be held within a narrow time-frame following the Commission's draft proposal: in its executive mode, in other words, the Council does not have the luxury of waiting for an eventual consensus to emerge, but is forced to engage in voting with, or most cases without, a minimum winning coalition if it wishes to have any say in the final decision. We know of no other area in which the full Council is so regularly drawn into decisions about the regulation of individual products, suggesting that the patterns of behavior we see here are at least atypical of Council decision-making overall. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the image of the Council as a consensual and deliberative body advanced by some scholars should at least be limited to its legislative role, while its executive role (especially where issues are referred to it because of a break-down of the comitology process) appears to demand a more rapid bargaining style in which minimum-winning coalitions, or indeed deadlocks among the member states, are more common.
